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PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONTRACT LAW, by Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai (eds)1
KENDALL GRANT
RECENT YEARS HAVE WITNESSED a revitalization of interest in the philosophical 
study of contract law. Driven by the “contract and promise debate” introduced 
in 1981, this new collection of essays combines work by leading philosophers, 
contract lawyers, and legal theorists to provide a comprehensive snapshot of 
contemporary scholarship on the topic and a roadmap for future research.
Part one, comprised of the first eleven essays, presents several theoretical 
approaches and focuses on general questions related to moral and political theory, 
conceptual analysis, sociological theory, empirical psychology, and economic 
analysis. Charles Fried expands on his groundbreaking original work2 and 
defends contract as a moral3 institution dependent on trust and a “recursive and 
transparent mirroring of mutual recognition and respect.”4 Next, Randy Barnett 
proposes an alternative model of “contract as consent” that applies no matter 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 416 pages.
2. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1981).
3. For Fried’s recent explanation of morality, see Charles Fried, “The Convergence of Contract 
and Promise” (2007) 120:1 Harv L Rev F 1 at 2-3.
4. Supra note 1 at 21.
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what the moral relationship5 between the parties, thereby encompassing the 
default rules of contract.6
Joseph Raz and David Owens then consider the normative position of the 
promisee. Raz explains that a promise gives the promisor a reason to perform 
because of the “normative assurance” it provides; the value of that assurance, and 
thus its associated strength, varies with each promise.7 For Owens, one cannot 
deprive oneself of the dignity of control simply by declaration;8 promises rather 
serve the promisee’s “authority interest.”9
Dori Kimel signals caution with respect to the “risky business” of strict 
promissory obligations given the potential for breach and its impact on the 
promisor’s autonomy. However, because promises are typically exchanged 
in relationships that “generate a wealth of relationship-specific norms,”10 the 
resulting moral obligations on the promisee may release the promisor from the 
promise, therefore reducing the “threat” of promising.
Some hold that contractual obligations are moral obligations but are 
not promissory in nature.11 James Penner contends that contracts should be 
understood as involving agreements rather than promises: promises are unilateral 
undertakings, while contracts are bilateral exchanges built on trust.12 On the other 
hand, Charlie Webb allows that contracts give rise to promissory obligations, but 
is not convinced that the promise is the reason for legal enforcement.13 Webb 
urges that inquiry into the philosophical foundations of contract law “need 
neither begin nor end with an account of promissory obligations.”14
5. For a more skeptical account of morality, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “The Divergence of 
Contract and Promise” (2007) 120:3 Harv L Rev 708.
6. Supra note 1 at 52-55.
7. Ibid at 76.
8. For a full discussion of choice and consent, including a formulation of Hume’s Point, see 
David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
9. Supra note 1 at 89.
10. Ibid at 110.
11. For a rejection of contract as promise and a thought experiment which recounts the 
possibility of undertaking contractual obligations while abjuring promissory ones, see 
Michael G Pratt, “Contract: Not Promise” (2008) 35:4 Fla St U L Rev 801.
12. Supra note 1 at 119-20.
13. Similarly, the assumption of a legal obligation in the context of a contract need not inevitably 
mean the assumption of a moral obligation. See e.g. Gregory Klass, “Promise Etc.” (2012) 
45:3 Suffolk U L Rev 695.
14. Supra note 1 at 150.
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Liam Murphy identifies three functions that contract law might play: (1) 
it might enforce the first-order moral obligation to perform, as per Fried; (2) it 
might enforce second-order obligations post-breach; or (3) it might be deployed 
instrumentally. Murphy adopts an inclusive hypothesis: contract law “supports 
and shapes the social practice of making and keeping promises and agreements.”15
Avery Katz applies economic analysis to freedom of contract, interpretation,16 
and damages.17 Due to their respective interests in maximizing efficiency gain and 
anticipating private activity, adjudicators, legislators, and contractors will find 
special value in the economic approach to contract law.18 Lastly, Aditi Bagchi 
asserts that not only should distributive injustices inform contract law’s approach 
to legal enforcement, but “some of the background duties that infuse contract are 
derivative from principles of distributive justice.”19
Part two, consisting of the final seven essays, delves into specific doctrinal 
questions of contract law. Margaret Jane Radin tackles take-it-or-leave-it contracts 
between unsophisticated parties. Finding that the only mechanism for enforcing 
such agreements—the doctrine of unconscionability—is unsatisfactory, Radin 
suggests a nonformalist framework for determining when to enforce boilerplate 
terms.20 Lisa Bernstein, by contrast, criticizes courts’ willingness to give legal effect 
to customary business norms, as well as their use of “context evidence,” on the basis 
that it deters flexibility21 and increases transaction costs for sophisticated parties.22
Daniel Markovits equates the duty of good faith with performance itself,23 and 
elaborates a theory that explains good faith as an attitude of reciprocal recognition, 
a foundation of contract as “collaboration.”24 In response, Mindy Chen-Wishart 
addresses the nature of vitiating factors in contract law and proposes both an 
15. Ibid at 169 [emphasis added].
16. See generally Richard A Posner, “The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation” (2005) 
83:6 Tex L Rev 1581.
17. Supra note 1 at 183-86.
18. Economic accounts, like consent theories, treat contract as a legal analog to the morality of 
promising. See Eric A Posner, “Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: 
Success or Failure?” (2003) 112:4 Yale LJ 829.
19. Supra note 1 at 199.
20. Ibid at 236-37.
21. For a case in favour of the more flexible “contracting for innovation,” see Ronald J Gilson, 
Charles F Sabel & Robert E Scott, “Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration” (2009) 109:3 Colum L Rev 431.
22. Supra note 1 at 258.
23. Ibid at 272 [emphasis in original].
24. For Markovits’ submission that contracts generate, as opposed to promises, a distinctive 
form of moral relationship, see Daniel Markovits, “Contract and Collaboration” (2004) 
113:7 Yale LJ 1417.
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enlarged conception of consent as well as a “two-step defeasibility approach” to 
legal rules that moves beyond contract as “merely” consent.25
George Letsas and Prince Saprai return to trust as the defining characteristic 
of contractual relationships. In their view, the making of a promise triggers 
“altruistic duties of assistance, over and above the duty to perform.”26 
Exemplifying a Commonwealth tradition of interpretive legal analysis that 
aims to uncover the law’s immanent logic, Stephen Smith finds that it is not 
breach of duty, but compensation for wrongdoing, that explains damage awards: 
“damages are the private law equivalent of punishment.”27 Finally, Gregory Klass 
recounts the well-known theory of efficient breach and offers an updated, more 
sophisticated version that reveals three features of contract law often overlooked 
by noneconomic theories.28
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law is an ambitious undertaking, 
with extensive coverage of the major theories and debates surrounding this 
commanding area of law. If, in its commendable efforts, it fails to engage 
with Hegelian, Aristotelian, corrective justice, or civil recourse theories,29 or 
with attempts to apply behavioural economics to contract law,30 it nonetheless 
represents a worthwhile and stimulating contribution to the literature.
25. Supra note 1 at 312-14.
26. Ibid at 325-26.
27. Ibid at 356.
28. Ibid at 363.
29. See e.g. Ernest J Weinrib, “Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies” (2003) 
78:1 Chi-Kent L Rev 55; Nathan B Oman, “Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse 
Theory of Contractual Liability” (2011) 96:2 Iowa L Rev 529.
30. See e.g. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A Hoffman, “Breach Is For Suckers” (2010) 63:4 
Vand L Rev 1001.
